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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 BANGKOK 000298

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SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE CSA-HOSTED VISIT OF THAI ARMY
COMMANDER GENERAL ANUPONG

Classified By: Ambassador Eric G. John, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

11. (C) General Casey, the upcoming visit of Thai Army Commander General Anupong Paojinda will be an important occasion to demonstrate our appreciation for the U.S.-Thai relationship. Despite ongoing domestic political challenges, Thailand's adherence to democratic values should not go unrecognized. General Anupong has been invaluable the past two years as he has resisted pressures from all sides for military intervention into politics; as a result, a full range of actors on the Thai political scene are able to openly and vigorously debate policies and the state of democracy. This visit is a prime opportunity to demonstrate clearly to our close ally that we intend to engage fully in the partnership, at a time when many in Thailand question U.S. commitment to the region in comparison to a sustained Chinese charm offensive. As examples of benefits from the relationship, the U.S.-Thai partnership has yielded a promising new lead in the drive to develop an HIV vaccination and the seizure of more than 35 tons of North Korean weapons in just the last three months alone, two examples that serve to illustrate the depth and breadth of a relationship. Furthermore, the Thai Cabinet in December approved a supplemental budget to facilitate a peacekeeping deployment to Darfur.

12. (C) General Anupong is the preeminent military leader in our steadfast ally and has been a strong advocate of not staging a coup and permitting the democratic process to play out, although with the Army ensuring security. Indeed, if you look back at the political turbulence of the past two years, he has been one of the more admirable figures in Thailand, and this counterpart visit is one way to express our appreciation for his actions. Anupong has had to make an extraordinary series of tough decisions over the past eighteen months, and his intellect and disposition have been key ingredients that have enabled him to make the choice to come down on the side of democracy, even as his troops wage a counterinsurgency campaign in Thailand's troubled southernmost provinces. We will also want to use this visit to send a signal to the rest of the Royal Thai Army that the United States values its relationship with the Thai military and Thailand. Anupong will likely be interested in pursuing discussions on regional security challenges, and how the U.S.-Thai alliance can be focused to assist as Thailand prepares for changing threats. Anupong will also look to discuss areas of cooperation, such as bilateral exercises and training, whereby we can assist the Thai military modernize.

Thai government officials and military leaders have also expressed strong interest in receiving excess defense articles by way of Thailand's status as a Major Non-NATO Ally, as Foreign Minister Kasit Piromya raised in 2009 with Secretary Clinton and other senior USG officials.

POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT

13. (SBU) The past eighteen months were turbulent for Thailand. Court decisions forced two Prime Ministers from office in 2008, and twice the normal patterns of political life took a back seat to disruptive protests in the streets. The yellow-shirted People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD) occupied Government House from August to December 2008 and shut down Bangkok's airports for eight days, to protest governments affiliated with ex-Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra. The red-shirted United Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship (UDD), followers of Thaksin, disrupted a regional Asian Summit and sparked riots in Bangkok in mid-April 2009 after Thaksin, now a fugitive abroad in the wake of an abuse of power conviction, called for a revolution to bring him home.

14. (C) 2010 promises to be contentious as well, with Thaksin and the red-shirts having vowed to redouble their efforts to topple the government. In recent weeks, the red-shirts have steadily increased a campaign to discredit and undermine the government, with promises of a "final battle" in late February that has many worried that violence could again return to the streets of Bangkok. Among their activities has

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been an operation to spread rumors of an impending coup, a rumor for which we have seen no basis.

15. (C) Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva is a photogenic, eloquent 45-year old Oxford graduate who generally has progressive instincts and says the right things about basic freedoms, social inequities, policy towards Burma, and how to address the troubled deep South, afflicted by a grinding ethno-nationalist Muslim-Malay separatist insurgency. Delivering results has proved more elusive, though the Thai economy is growing again, driven by expanding exports.

16. (C) While both yellow and red try to lay exclusive claim to the mantle of democracy, both have ulterior motives in doing so. Both movements reflect deep social concerns stemming from widespread perceptions of a lack of social and economic justice, but both seek to triumph in competing for traditional Thai hierarchical power relationships. New elections would not appear to be a viable solution to political divide, and political discord could persist for years. We continue to stress to Thai interlocutors the need for all parties to avoid violence and respect democratic norms within the framework of the constitution and rule of law, as well as our support for long-time friend Thailand to work through its current difficulties and emerge as a more participatory democracy.

RECEDING MONARCHY

17. (C) Underlying the political tension in Bangkok is the future of the monarchy. On the throne for 62 years, U.S.-born King Bhumibol is Thailand's most prestigious figure, with influence far beyond his constitutional mandate. Many actors, including in the military, are jockeying for position to shape the expected transition period in Thailand during royal succession after the eventual passing of the King. Few observers believe that the deep political and social divides can be bridged until after King Bhumibol passes and Thailand's tectonic plates shift. Crown Prince Vajiralongkorn neither commands the respect nor displays the charisma of his beloved father, who has greatly expanded the prestige and influence of the monarchy during his reign.

Nearly everyone expects the monarchy to shrink and change in function after succession. How much will change is open to question, with many institutions, figures, and political forces positioning for influence, not only over redefining the institution of monarchy but, equally fundamentally, what it means to be Thai.

SOUTHERN THAILAND - SEPARATIST INSURGENCY

¶8. (C) An ethno-nationalist Malay Muslim insurgency in southern Thailand has claimed an estimated 3,500 lives since ¶2004. Fundamental issues of justice and ethnic identity drive the violence as many Malay Muslims feel that they are second-class citizens in Thailand, and ending the insurgency will require the government to deal with these issues on a national level. The insurgents use IEDs, assassinations, and beheadings to challenge the control of the Thai state in the deep South; the government has responded through special security laws that give security forces expanded power to search and detain people. The Thai military is now deeply involved in counter-insurgency efforts; in contrast, from the late 1990s-2004, the military viewed the top national security threat to be the flow of illegal narcotics from neighboring Burma.

¶9. (C) The insurgents direct their anger at the government in Bangkok, not at the United States. Since a U.S. presence or perception of U.S. involvement in the South could redirect that anger towards us and link it to the international jihadist movement -- a link that is currently absent - we ensure that any offers of assistance or training pass the "location and label" test. Put simply, we keep U.S. military personnel away from the far South and we make sure that we do not label any assistance or training as directly linked to the southern situation. This approach dovetails with the

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Thai interest in keeping outside influences and actors away from the internal conflict.

¶10. (C) General Anupong has dedicated more of his time to overseeing RTA counter-insurgency efforts in South than past Army Commanders, who often were more focused on politics in Bangkok. Anupong makes almost weekly trips to the South, and he and his senior staff have engaged the Embassy and USARPAC in an effort to learn counter-insurgency and counter-IED best practices.

ENDURING BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP

¶11. (C) Despite the political divide, Thailand's unparalleled strategic importance to the U.S. should not be understated. The U.S.-Thai military relationship, which began during World War II when the U.S. trained Thais to covertly conduct special operations against the Japanese forces occupying Thailand has evolved into a partnership that provides the U.S. with unique benefits. Our military engagement affords us unique training venues, the opportunity to conduct exercises that are nearly impossible to match elsewhere, a willing participant in international peacekeeping operations, essential access to facilities amid vital sea and air lanes that support contingency and humanitarian missions, and a partner that is a key ASEAN nation in which we continue to promote democratic ideals.

¶12. (C) Thailand's willingness to allow the United States to use Utapao Naval Air Station as the hub for our regional assistance program was key to making the 2004 tsunami and the 2008 Cyclone Nargis relief operations a success. While those high-profile relief operations highlighted publicly the value of access to Utapao, the air base is used regularly for military flights. A prime example was the critical support Utapao provided during OEF by providing an air bridge in support of refueling missions en route to Afghanistan.

Approximately 1,000 flights transit Utapao every year in support of critical U.S. military operations both regionally and to strategic areas of the world. Thailand also provides valued port access with U.S. naval vessels making calls, primarily at Laem Chabang and Sattahip, over sixty times per year for exercises and visits.

¶13. (SBU) Beyond traditional military activities, our bilateral military relationship provides benefits in other important areas. One example is the Armed Forces Research Institute of Medical Sciences' (AFRIMS) collaboration with Thai counterparts on basic research and trial vaccines. The sophistication of the Thai scientific and public health community makes collaboration as useful to the USG as it is to the Thais. A number of important breakthroughs, such as in the prevention of HIV/AIDS transmission from mothers to children, were developed here, and the first partially successful phase III, double blind trial for a potential HIV vaccine occurred in 2009; a second such trial run by CDC is currently ongoing.

COBRA GOLD AND THE MILITARY EXERCISE PROGRAM

¶14. (C) By means of access to good military base infrastructure and large areas to conduct unrestricted operations, Thailand gives the U.S. military a platform for exercises unique in Asia. Thai leaders are far more willing to host multinational and bilateral exercises than are other countries in Asia. This has allowed us to use exercises in Thailand to further key U.S. objectives, such as supporting Japan's growing military role in Asia and engaging the Indonesian and Singaporean militaries.

¶15. (C) Cobra Gold, the capstone event of our exercise program and being held during the visit, is the largest annual multi-lateral exercise in the Pacific region and for 29 years has served to strengthen our relations with Thailand, highlight our commitment to Southeast Asia, and provide exceptional training opportunities for our troops. The event has evolved over the years and now facilitates

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important objectives such as promoting a greater role in the Asian Pacific region for Japan, Singapore, and South Korea and re-establishing a partner role with Indonesia. As an example of the tangible benefits of the exercise, USARPAC is using this year's Cobra Gold to test a deployable command post for crisis situations such as HA/DR incidents. Cope Tiger, a leading air exercise with the Thailand and Singapore, and CARAT, a bilateral naval event, are key mechanisms for engagement of the Royal Thai Air Force and Navy. The Thai military continues to highlight to us the significance of these events for training and for relationship building.

PEACEKEEPING EFFORTS AND DARFUR DEPLOYMENT

¶16. (C) Thailand has historically been a strong supporter of UN peacekeeping missions and was an early contributing nation to operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. In addition, Thai generals very effectively led UN forces in East Timor, to which Thailand contributed 1,500 troops, and in Aceh where a Thai general served as the principal deputy of the Aceh Monitoring Mission. Thailand is preparing for deploying a battalion of troops for a difficult UNAMID mission in Darfur and has asked for USG assistance. State recently identified \$2.4 million to be used to support equipment needed by the Thai for the deployment, and we have used various funding sources to increase overall Thai peacekeeping capabilities, both as a contributing nation and as a trainer of neighboring nations.

BORDER CONFLICT WITH CAMBODIA

¶17. (C) Bilateral relations with Cambodia remain volatile, primarily due to a border dispute centered on 4.6 square kilometers of overlapping territorial claims adjacent to the 11th century Hindu Preah Vihear temple. Minor skirmishes have erupted four times since mid-2008, leading to the deaths of seven soldiers. Cambodian Prime Hun Sen's November 2009 decision to appoint Thaksin as an economic advisor further stoked cross-border tensions. Furthermore, there have been at least six reports of small-scale conflicts resulting from cross-border illegal logging activities in recent months.

¶18. (C) The roots of the border dispute lie in the Siam-France agreements of 1904-8 and a 1962 International Court of Justice ruling that granted Cambodia the temple but left the rest of disputed land unresolved. Tensions spiked in 2008 when the Thai government in power at that time supported Cambodia's application to UNESCO for a joint listing of the temple as a world heritage site, only to face opposition in parliament and an adverse court ruling. Thorny internal political considerations and historical rancor between Thailand and Cambodia make progress difficult. We urge both sides to resolve their differences peacefully through bilateral negotiations, border demarcation, and a reduction of troops deployed along the border.

ONGOING REFUGEE CONCERNS: HMONG AND BURMA

¶19. (C) Due to inherent institutional capabilities, the Thai military plays a prominent role in the management of the many refugees that enter Thailand from neighboring countries. Thailand continues to host more than 140,000 Burmese and facilitate resettlement of more than 14,000 refugees to the U.S. annually, but the recent forced repatriation of two groups of Lao Hmong in late December provoked international outcry. The USG and Congress are also focused on 4,000 ethnic Karen in a Thai army-run camp along the Thai-Burma border who came into Thailand last June fleeing an offensive and who may be sent back in the near future. (Note: 140,000 Karen and Karenni have lived in RTG-sanctioned camps along the border since 1990. End Note.) We underscore to the RTG our disappointment with the Hmong deportation decision and our continuing concern over access to the Hmong now that they have been returned to Laos, as well as our concerns on the Thai-Burma border.

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THE INCREASING ROLE OF CHINA

¶20. (C) As the shape of Southeast Asia, Asia writ large, and the world has changed, so have Thai attitudes. The Chinese have been making a major push to upgrade all aspects of relations, including mil-mil. Thailand is not interested in making a choice between the U.S. and China (nor do we see closer Chinese-Thai relations as automatically threatening to our interests here), but we will need to work harder to maintain the preferred status we have enjoyed. While Thai military links with the United States are deeper and far more apparent than Sino-Thai links, China's growing influence in Thailand is readily evident.

¶21. (C) The Chinese have made a strong effort to court the Thai. The Thai military has a range of Chinese weapons systems in its arsenal; the PLA Navy is interested in closer links with the Thai navy, and China has worked with Thailand to improve air defense equipment provided to Thailand in the late 1980's. In 2007 and 2008, Thai and Chinese Special Forces conducted joint exercises, and other mil-to-mil exchanges have expanded in recent years, as has the number of bilateral military VIP visits.

¶22. (C) During a visit to Thailand by Chinese Minister of National Defense Liang Guanglie for the King's birthday

celebrations in early December 2009, the Thai and Chinese militaries agreed to expand bilateral exercises to include the two nations' navies, marines, and air forces. The initial exercise will be conducted early this year, with the PLA engaging Thai sailors and marines through an amphibious landing event and a naval rescue and humanitarian relief exercise. While some entities within the RTG resisted the expanded engagement, reportedly the MFA and the Marine Commandant, the Thai tell us that the Chinese pushed hard for a rapid expansion of bilateral exercises. The Thai Marines suggested to us that the exercise would be held at the platoon or company level; it is unclear how many Navy personnel may participate. While there are those in the Thai military who have resisted expanding ties with the Chinese, Foreign Minister Kasit during an early November meeting with EAP Deputy Assistant Secretary Scot Marciel warned that Thailand could not continue to say no, and that the U.S. military needed to more seriously re-engage with their Thai counterparts.

¶23. (C) The expansion of joint exercises follows China providing Thailand with \$49 million in military assistance following the 2006 coup. Beyond exercises and assistance, the number of exchanges by Thai and Chinese officers studying at military institutes has increased significantly in recent years, particularly since the coup. The PLA has also actively courted Thai military leaders, including Defense Minister Prawit Wongsuwan, Chief of Defense Forces General Songkitti Jaggabatra, and General Anupong, through multiple hosted-visits to China.

JOHN